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PARTIES 
The appellant and cross-appellee is defendant Lynn A. Jenkins I ("Jenkins"). The 
appellees and cross-appellants are plaintiffs Terry Smedley ("Smedley") and 
Countrybrook, L.L.C. ("Countrybrook") (collectively "Plaintiffs"). 
STATEMENT OF .JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002), the Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction of this appeal from the trial court's Judgment dated April 8, 2002 and entered 
April 11, 2002. (R. at 682-84). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiffs offer the following statement of issues in lieu of that contained on pages 
1 through 3 of Jenkins' Opening Brief ("Jenkins Brief). This formulation of the issues 
more accurately captures the arguments presented to the trial court and the bases for the 
trial court's decision below.1 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the trial court's finding of fact that the Notice of Real 
and/or Personal Property Interests recorded by Jenkins in Weber County, Utah on 
September 13, 1999 ("Notice of Interest") was not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to 
As a preliminary matter, Jenkins' opening brief is untimely. On December 2, 
2002, this Court set the briefing schedule for this appeal. This Court instructed Jenkins to 
serve and file his brief on or before January 14, 2003. On January 13, 2003, Jenkins 
moved this Court for an extension of time to file his brief. Pursuant to an Order dated 
January 15, 2003, this Court granted Jenkins an extension until February 13, 2003 to file 
his brief. Despite this extension, however, Jenkins did not file his brief until February 21, 
2003. Accordingly, this Court may dismiss Jenkins' appeal on this basis. See Utah R. 
App. P. 26 (c) (Failure to file timely brief may result in dismissal of the appeal). 
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a document signed by the owner of the real property; (b) expressly authorized by a state 
or federal statute; or (c) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in this state was clearly erroneous? 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, may not be set 
aside unless they are clearly erroneous. See Lefavi v. Bertoch, 994 P.2d 817, 821 ^[16 
(Utah Ct. App. 2000) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). The trial court's findings are clearly 
erroneous only if the ruling "contradicts the great weight of evidence or if [the] court 
reviewing the evidence is left with ca definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made.'" Sew v. Security Title Co. of So. Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 635 (Utah 1995) (quoting 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
To mount a successful challenge to the trial court's findings of fact on appeal, 
Jenkins must '"marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the findings.'" Tanner v. Carter, 20 P.3d 332, 336 % 17 
(Utah 2001) (quoting Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)). This 
means that Jenkins "must play the devil's advocate" and "extricate [himself] from [his] 
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. . . . [He] must present, in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings that [Jenkins] resists." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage 
& Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original). Once Jenkins has "established every pillar supporting 
[Plaintiffs'] position, [he] then 'must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence' and show 
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why those pillars fail to support the trial court's findings." Id. (quoting West Valley City 
v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). If Jenkins fails to so 
marshal the evidence, this Court "need not consider the challenge to the sufficiency of the 
findings." Tanner, 20 P.3d at 3361 17. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the trial court's finding of fact that the twenty additional 
documents, including letters from attorneys, stipulations, orders, a title commitment, a 
certificate of limited partnership and certificates of authority, which were recorded on the 
real property by Jenkins in Weber County, Utah on July 31, 2000 ("Recorded 
Documents") were not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the 
owner of the real property; (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute; or (c) 
authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in 
this state was clearly erroneous? 
As stated above, to challenge the trial court's findings of fact, Jenkins must 
marshal the evidence. See id. If he fails to do so, his challenge is "nothing more than an 
attempt to reargue the case" and this Court must "'assume[] that the record supports the 
findings of the trial court and proceed[] to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's 
conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case." See Campbell v. Box 
Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Heber City Corp. v. 
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 312 (Utah 1997)). 
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the trial court's conclusion of the law that the Notice of 
Interest was a wrongful lien under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 through 38-9-7 was correct? 
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Conclusions of law are reviewed on appeal for correctness and are accorded no 
deference. Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen Co-op., 48 P.3d 910, 914 f 16 (Utah 
2002); Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5 P.3d 1206, 1212 f 18 (Utah 2000); 
State v. Comer, 51 P.3d 55, 61 f 12 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether the trial court's conclusion of law that the Recorded 
Documents were wrongful liens under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 through 38-9-7 was 
correct? 
As set forth above, conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Western 
Dairymen, 48 P.3d at 914 f 16; Silver Fork, 5 P.3d at 1212 f 18; Comer, 51 P.3d at 61 
112-
ISSUE NO. 5: Whether the trial court's conclusion of law that Plaintiffs were 
entitled to the $30,000 in escrow pursuant to Jenkins' Partial Release of Notice of Interest 
was correct? 
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Western Dairymen, 48 P.3d at 
914 <J 16; Silver Fork, 5 P.3d at 1212 f 18; Comer, 51 P.3d at 61 % 12. 
ISSUE NO. 6: Whether the trial court's conclusion of law that Jenkins was liable 
to Plaintiffs for damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-9-4 was correct? 
The issue of whether attorneys' fees are recoverable in an action is a question of 
law that this Court reviews for correctness. Softsolutions v. Brigham Young Univ., 1 
P.3d 1095, 1099 I 12 (Utah 2000) (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 
(Utah 1998)); Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 20 P.3d 868, 874 (][ 21 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
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Matters of statutory construction are also questions of law that this Court reviews for 
correctness. A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guv, 47 P.3d 92, 94 f 7 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2002) (citing Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997)). 
ISSUE NO. 7: Whether the trial court's finding of fact that Plaintiffs' attorneys' 
fees and costs were reasonable was clearly erroneous? 
The calculation of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs is in the sound discretion of 
the trial court and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of 
discretion. Caffertv v. Hughes. 46 P.3d 233, 238 f 26 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); Schafir v. 
Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1394 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 
764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988)). Thus, in decisions dealing with fee awards, "appellate 
deference is owed to the trial judge who actually presided over the proceeding and has 
first-hand familiarity with the litigation." Whipple Plumbing, 47 P.3d at 94 % 8 (citing 
Bracken, 764 P.2d at 988 and Utah Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1991)). 
ISSUE NO- 8: Whether the trial court's finding of fact that Plaintiffs incurred 
$13,550.00 in actual damages was clearly erroneous? 
As set forth above, findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, may not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Lefavi, 994 P.2d at 821 
<! 16. To challenge the trial court's finding of fact, Jenkins must marshal the evidence. 
Tanner, 20 P.3d at 336117. 
ISSUE NO. 9: Whether the trial court's refusal to treble the damages awarded to 
Plaintiffs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4(2) was correct? 
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This issue calls for statutory interpretation and "thus presents a question of law 
which [is] review[ed] for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions." Russell v. Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244, 1246 f 8 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
This issue was preserved below with Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Awarding Damages, Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
(R. at 344-59) and Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment. (R. at 664-71). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action arises under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 
through 38-9-7 ("Utah Wrongful Lien Act"). Smedley was the owner of certain real 
property located in Weber County, Utah ("Property"). (R. at 295). Through a series of 
conveyances in December 1997 and June 1999, Smedley conveyed a portion of the 
Property to the City of Roy ("Roy Parcel") and a portion of the Property to Country West 
Construction & Real Estate, Inc. ("Country West Parcel") pursuant to Warranty Deeds. 
(R. at 295-96). Plaintiffs retained fee title to the remainder of the Property 
("Countrybrook Parcel"). (R. at 296). 
On September 13, 1999, Jenkins recorded the Notice of Interest in Weber County, 
Utah on all of the Property. (R. at 296). Plaintiffs immediately initiated proceedings 
under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act by sending a written demand to Jenkins to remove the 
Notice of Interest. (R. at 296). Although Jenkins agreed to release the Notice of Interest 
from the Country West Parcel, Jenkins refused to release the Notice of Interest from the 
516298 4 6 
Roy Parcel or the Countrybrook Parcel. (R. at 296). Consequently, Plaintiffs were 
forced to file a petition under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act for removal of the Notice of 
Interest. (R. at 1-30). After Plaintiffs filed the petition, Jenkins also recorded the 
Recorded Documents on the Roy Parcel and the Countrybrook Parcel. (R. at 297). 
Despite the expedited proceedings provided for in the Utah Wrongful Lien Act, it 
took over one year for Plaintiffs to obtain a release of the Notice of Interest and the 
Recorded Documents and over two years to obtain a final Judgment because of numerous 
meritless pleadings filed by Jenkins. (R. at 294-99; 675-84). These pleadings, which 
unnecessarily delayed the proceedings and increased Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, required 
four separate hearings with the trial court. (R. at 149; 245; 602; 674). During all of this 
time, Plaintiffs were prevented from using or developing the Countrybrook Parcel. (R. at 
351-54). At the conclusion of these proceedings, the trial court entered Judgment in 
favor of Plaintiffs. (R. at 682-84). This appeal followed. (R. at 686-87). 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This cross appeal is from the Judgment dated April 8, 2002 and entered on April 
11, 2002. (R. at 682-84). This Judgment is the result of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order entered on April 8, 2002, whereby the trial court granted 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Awarding Damages, Attorneys' Fees and Costs (R. at 294-
99), and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated November 28, 2000 
and entered on November 30, 2000, whereby the trial court granted Plaintiffs' Petition to 
Nullify Wrongful Liens and Releasing Liens from the Property (R. at 675-84). 
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Jenkins filed a Notice of Appeal on April 22, 2002. (R. at 686-87). On May 10, 
2002, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Cross Appeal on that portion of the Judgment relating to 
the trial court's refusal to treble Plaintiffs' damages. (R. at 708-09). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In contrast to Jenkins' Statement of Case (Jenkins Brief at 3-7), which, among 
things, omits certain important facts, mischaracterizes other facts and alleges facts that 
are either not relevant to the issues before the Court or contain factual conclusions or 
legal conclusions not supported by the record, Plaintiffs offer the following Statement of 
Facts:2 
1. Smedley was the fee simple owner of the Property, which consisted of 
approximately 4.93 acres of undeveloped real property in Weber County, Utah. (R. at 
295). The Property was to be developed into a residential subdivision in two phases that 
were referred to as Phase 9 and Phase 10. (R. at 351-54). 
2. On July 20, 1999, Plaintiffs conveyed the Country West Parcel to Country 
West Construction & Real Estate, Inc. ("Country West"). Plaintiffs retained fee title to 
the Countrybrook Parcel. (R. at 296). 
Jenkins' opening brief fails to comply with Rule 24(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure because it fails to cite to the record. Consequently, this Court 
should assume the correctness of the Judgment below with respect to the issues appealed 
by Jenkins. See Fackrell v. Fackrell 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987) (If a party fails to 
make a concise statement of the facts and citation to the pages in the record where those 
facts are supported, the Court will assume the correctness of the judgment below); 
Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) ('This Court 
need not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the 
record"). 
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3. On or about September 13, 1999, Jenkins recorded the Notice of Interest. 
(R. at 296). At this time, Plaintiffs had substantially completed development of Phase 9 
of the Property. Plaintiffs were in the process of obtaining financing for development of 
Phase 10 of the Property. (R. at 351-54). 
4. On September 24, 1999, Plaintiffs gave Jenkins written notice that the 
Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien on the Property. Jenkins did not remove the 
Notice of Interest within twenty (20) days of the written notice. (R. at 296). 
5. On November 23, 1999, Jenkins executed a Partial Release of Notice of 
Interest and Quit Claim Deed releasing the Notice of Interest from the Country West 
Parcel in exchange for Plaintiffs' placement of $30,000 in an escrow account with 
Bonneville Title Company, Inc., which served as substitute property for the Country 
West Parcel. (R. at 296). 
6. On January 31, 2000, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. The Complaint 
sought an Order (a) setting aside the Notice of Interest, (b) awarding the $30,000 in 
escrow to Plaintiffs, (c) awarding damages and attorneys' fees and costs to Plaintiffs, and 
(d) restraining Jenkins from filing any liens or other encumbrances on the Property. (R. 
at 1-30). 
7. On February 22, 2000, Jenkins filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds 
that Plaintiffs failed to join an indispensable party. (R. at 34-111). On April 17, 2002, 
the trial court held a hearing on Jenkins' Motion to Dismiss, which the trial court denied. 
(R. at 149). 
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8. On May 11, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Hearing on Petition to 
Nullify Wrongful Lien pursuant to the Utah Wrongful Lien Act. (R. at 150-51). 
Plaintiffs' Motion asserted that the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien under the Utah 
Wrongful Lien Act because it was not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document 
signed by the owner of the Property, (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute, 
or (c) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in this state. (R. at 152-97). 
9. On May 22, 2000, Jenkins filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File 
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. (R. at 202-04). Plaintiffs did not oppose the 
Motion. On August 4, 2000, the trial court issued a memorandum decision granting 
Jenkins until August 24, 2000 to file his Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. (R. at 
229-30). Jenkins failed to file his Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint by August 
24, 2000. 
10. On July 31, 2000, Jenkins recorded the Recorded Documents on the 
Property, which consisted of letters from attorneys, stipulations, orders, a title 
commitment, a certificate of limited partnership and certificates of authority. (R. at 297). 
11. On September 20, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Petition to Nullify 
Wrongful Lien, which asserted that the Recorded Documents were also wrongful liens 
under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act. (R. at 237-44). 
12. Jenkins did not file an opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion and Supplemental 
Petition. Instead, Jenkins filed an Answer that claimed he "would allege he meets all 
three requirements" for a valid lien under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act. The Answer also 
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claimed that the $30,000 placed in escrow was to be "compensation to Jenkins as partial 
consideration for his Partial Release" of the Country West Parcel. (R. at 205-19). 
13. On October 2, 2000, the trial court held a hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion and 
Supplemental Petition. (R. at 245). On November 30, 2000, the trial court entered its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. at 294-99). The trial court found 
that the Notice of Interest and Recorded Documents were wrongful liens under the Utah 
Wrongful Lien Act. The trial court further found that Plaintiffs were entitled to the 
$30,000 in escrow. Finally, the trial court found that Jenkins was liable to Plaintiffs for 
damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs but reserved the amount of such 
damages, attorneys' fees and costs for future determination. (R. at 294-99). 
14. On June 19, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Order Awarding Damages, 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Motion claimed that Plaintiffs were entitled to treble 
damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The Motion was supported by the 
Affidavit of Laura S. Scott and the Affidavit of T. Richard Davis, both counsel for 
Plaintiffs. (R. at 302-32). On July 13, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental 
Memorandum supported by the Affidavit of Terry Smedley. (R. at 344-59). 
15. In his Affidavit, Smedley testified that during the approximately one year it 
took to obtain the Order releasing the Notice of Interest and the Recorded Documents 
from the Property, the price for oil, asphalt, PVC pipe, and other oil-related products 
increased substantially, resulting in an increase in the cost of improvements to Phase 10 
of the Property by $13,550.00. (R. at 354). 
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16. Smedley further testified that at the time Jenkins recorded his wrongful 
liens, Plaintiffs had completed most of the improvements for Phase 9 of the Property, 
which was sold to E. Gregory Higley ("Mr. Higley") dba Country West Construction and 
Real Estate, Inc. ("Country West") pursuant to a written agreement ("Phase 9 
Agreement"). As a result of the wrongful liens recorded by Jenkins, however, Mr. Higley 
did not pay Plaintiffs the final $30,000 payment due under the Phase 9 Agreement. 
Instead, Plaintiffs agreed that this payment would be deposited in escrow pending a 
determination by the court that the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien. (R. at 351— 
54). 
17. Finally, Smedley testified that Plaintiffs did not receive any "benefit" from 
the delay caused by the wrongful liens recorded by Jenkins because Mr. Higley was only 
obligated to buy the lots for $30,400 per lot under the Phase 9 Agreement. (R. at 351— 
54). 
18. On September 10, 2001, the trial court held a hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion. 
At the hearing, Jenkins argued that the fair market value of the Property increased from 
September 1999 to December 2000 and that such increase should be an "offset" to any 
damages awarded to Plaintiffs. Jenkins also alleged that there were inconsistencies in the 
Plaintiffs' documents regarding the costs of improvements. (R. at 602). 
19. In response, Plaintiffs established that although the fair market value of the 
lots in Phase 10 may have increased during the period from September 1999 to December 
2000, Plaintiffs were not able to take advantage of any increase in fair market value 
because they were contractually obligated to sell the lots in Phase 10 to Mr. Higley for a 
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set price pursuant to an agreement negotiated in September 1999 ("Phase 10 
Agreement"). (R. at 602). 
20. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court requested that the parties 
submit supplemental affidavits regarding this issue. (R. at 602). 
21. On December 11, 2001, Plaintiffs filed the Supplemental Affidavit of Terry 
Smedley. In his Supplemental Affidavit, Smedley testified that in early September 1999, 
Mr. Higley and Smedley negotiated the Phase 10 Agreement for the purchase of the 15 
lots in Phase 10 of the Property. The Phase 10 Agreement stated that the purchase price 
for the 15 lots in Phase 10 was $33,000 per lot for a total purchase price of $495,000. 
The Phase 10 Agreement was signed by both Mr. Higley and Smedley prior to September 
21, 1999. It was amended on or about January 2, 2001 but the purchase price did not 
change. (R. at 603-40). 
22. Smedley further testified that although the fair market value of the lots in 
Phase 10 may have increased during the period from September 1999 to December 2000, 
Plaintiffs were not able to take advantage of any increase in fair market value because 
Plaintiffs were contractually obligated to sell the lots in Phase 10 to Mr. Higley for 
$495,000, or $33,000 per lot, pursuant to the Phase 10 Agreement. (R. at 603-40). 
23. Smedley further testified that the alleged "inconsistency" with respect to 
the costs of improvements was just an attempt to simplify the damages calculation by 
eliminating the 10% contingency included in the cost estimates prepared in June 1999 
and January 2001. When the 10% contingency was excluded from both estimates, the 
difference between the June 1999 estimate of $141,581.25 and the January 2001 estimate 
516298.4 ] 3 
of $155,131.75 is $13,550.50, which is the amount of damages that Plaintiffs were 
requesting. (R. at 603-40). 
24. Jenkins did not submit his own supplemental affidavits or otherwise 
challenge the Supplemental Affidavit of Terry Smedley. (R. at 643-44). 
25. On January 15, 2002, the trial court issued its Decision granting Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Order Awarding Damages, Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The trial court 
awarded Plaintiffs actual damages of $13,550.00 and their attorneys' fees and costs. The 
trial court declined to treble the actual damages because it believed that trebling was an 
"unlawful penalty." The trial court requested that counsel for Plaintiffs prepare the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. at 643-44). 
26. Plaintiffs submitted proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order to Jenkins for his approval. Jenkins filed an Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed 
Findings and Conclusions on February 22, 2002. (R. at 656-61). 
27. On April 8, 2002, the trial court held a hearing on Jenkins' Objection. (R. 
at 674). The trial court denied Jenkins' Objection, signed the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order and entered a final Judgment (a) declaring that the Notice 
of Interest and Recorded Documents were wrongful liens on the Property and void ab 
initio-, (b) awarding Plaintiffs damages in the amount of $13,550.00; (c) awarding 
Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of $20,261.75; and (d) awarding 
Plaintiffs costs in the amount of $459.06. (R. at 675-84). 
28. Jenkins filed his Notice of Appeal on April 22, 2002. (R. at 686-87). 
Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Cross Appeal on May 10, 2002. (R. at 708-09). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly determined that the Notice of Interest and the Recorded 
Documents were wrongful liens under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act because they were 
not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the 
Property, (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute, or (c) authorized by or 
contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in Utah. (R. at 
294-99). Consequently, under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act, Plaintiffs were entitled to 
treble actual damages and their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The trial court 
properly determined that Plaintiffs' actual damages were $13,550.00 and that their 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs were $20,720.81. (R. at 675-84). The trial court, 
however, incorrectly refused to treble Plaintiffs' actual damages as required by the Utah 
Wrongful Lien Act. (R. at 675-84). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE NOTICE 
OF INTEREST AND THE RECORDED DOCUMENTS WERE 
WRONGFUL LIENS UNDER THE UTAH WRONGFUL LIEN ACT. 
A. The Utah Wrongful Lien Act. 
The Utah Wrongful Lien Act is found in Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1 through 38-9-
7. The Utah Wrongful Lien Act provides that a "lien claimant who records or files or 
causes a wrongful lien to be recorded against real property is liable to a record holder of 
interest for any actual damages proximately caused by the wrongful lien." Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-9-4(1) (2002) (emphasis added). A "lien claimant" is defined as "a person 
claiming an interest in real property who offers a document for recording or filing with 
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any county recorder in the state asserting a lien or other claim of interest in certain real 
property." Id § 38-9-1(2). A "holder of interest" is defined as "a person who holds or 
possesses a present, lawful property interest in certain real property . . . and whose name 
and interest in that real property appears in the county recorder's records for the county in 
which the property is located." Id. § 38-9-1(4). The Act defines a "wrongful lien" as: 
any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance 
on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time 
it is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or 
federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of 
a court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed 
by the owner of the real property. 
Id §38-9-1(6). 
If the lien claimant refuses to release the wrongful lien within twenty (20) days of 
a written request by an interest holder, the lien claimant is liable to such interest holder 
for $1,000 or treble damages, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorneys' fees and 
costs. Id § 38-9-4(2). If the lien claimant knows or has reason to know that the 
document is a wrongful lien, groundless, or contains a material misstatement or false 
claim, the lien claimant is liable to an interest holder for $3,000 or treble damages, 
whichever is greater, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Id § 38-9-4(3). A lien is 
"groundless" when there is "no arguable basis" for the lien or it "is not supported by any 
credible evidence." Commercial Inv. Corp, v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1111 (Utah Ct. 
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App. 1997) (This Court defines "groundless" as "a claim of interest in real property [that] 
has no arguable basis or is not supported by any credible evidence"). 
An interest holder is entitled to a hearing on its petition to nullify the lien within 
ten (10) days of filing the petition. Following the hearing, the trial court must determine 
whether the document is a wrongful lien. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7(5)(a) (2002). If the 
document is a wrongful lien, the trial court must issue an order declaring the document to 
be a wrongful lien, releasing the real property from the lien and awarding attorneys' fees 
and costs to the interest holder. Id. The amount of such attorneys' fees and costs is 
reserved for future determination. Id 
B. Plaintiffs Had Standing to Challenge the Notice of Interest and the 
Recorded Documents* 
In his opening brief, Jenkins asserts that the trial court "erred by recognizing 
Plaintiffs as the owners of [the Property] on September 13, 1999, the date of the 
recording of the Notice of Interest." (Jenkins Brief at 1). Not only does Jenkins fail to 
marshal any evidence to support the trial court's finding of fact, he fails to cite to any 
competent evidence in the record to support his argument. In any event, this argument is 
without merit. 
Throughout his opening brief, Jenkins fails to marshal any evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings of fact. Rather than bearing his marshaling burden, Jenkins has 
"merely presented carefully selected facts" in support of his position, which is "nothing 
more than an attempt to reargue the case." See Oneida, 872 P.2d at 1053. By failing to 
marshal the evidence, Jenkins has put Plaintiffs "in a precarious position" and have 
compelled them to do his work "at considerable time and expense." IdL at 1053-54. 
Such tactics should be rejected and this Court should refuse to consider the merits of his 
challenges to the trial court's findings of fact. 
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As stated above, the Utah Wrongful Lien Act provides that a "lien claimant who 
records or files or causes a wrongful lien to be recorded against real property is liable to a 
record holder of interest for any actual damages proximately caused by the wrongful 
lien." Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4(1) (2002) (emphasis added). A "holder of interest" is 
defined as "a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful property interest in certain 
real property . . . and whose name and interest in that real property appears in the county 
recorder's records for the county in which the property is located." Id § 38-9-1(4). 
During the proceedings below, Jenkins did not dispute that Plaintiffs owned the 
Countrybrook Parcel when Jenkins recorded the Notice of Interest on September 13, 
1999. (R. at 152-97). This alone gave Plaintiffs standing to challenge the Notice of 
Interest. Moreover, Jenkins did not dispute that Plaintiffs conveyed the Country West 
Parcel and the Roy Parcel pursuant to Warranty Deeds, which included certain covenants 
by Plaintiffs, including the covenant "to forever warrant and defend the title" in Country 
West and the City of Roy. (R. at 167). See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (2002). When 
Jenkins recorded the Notice of Interest, Plaintiffs were obligated under the Warranty 
Deeds to take appropriate action to remove this wrongful lien from the Country West 
Parcel and the Roy Parcel. The City of Roy and Country West also specifically requested 
that Plaintiffs take appropriate action to remove the wrongful lien. (R. at 169). The fact 
that Jenkins released the Notice of Interest from the Country West Parcel did not 
eliminate the need for a judicial determination as to the validity of the Notice of Interest. 
As stated in the Affidavit of E. Gregory Higley filed in support of Jenkins' Motion to 
Dismiss, Mr. Higley retained an attorney to prepare the Partial Release of the Notice of 
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Interest, which contemplated that there would be a judicial determination of Jenkins' 
purported interest in the Property, including the Country West Parcel. (R. at 416-599). 
The action below did just that. 
Finally, the "evidence" submitted by Jenkins with his opening brief does not 
support his assertion that Plaintiffs were not interest holders under the Utah Wrongful 
Lien Act. (Jenkins Brief at 9-10). Attachment C is simply a copy of the Notice of 
Interest. Attachment H is an unauthenticated "MCV Phasing Plan Sub" that appears to 
have been created or altered by Jenkins. The Preliminary Title Report referred to by 
Jenkins in his opening brief is not even attached to the Jenkins Brief.4 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs were "holders of 
interest" under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act and had standing to challenge the Notice of 
Interest and the Recorded Documents. This Court should affirm the trial court's 
conclusion. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Notice of Interest Was 
a Wrongful Lien Under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act. 
The trial court correctly determined that the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien 
under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act. (R. at 294-99). The Notice of Interest claims an 
interest in: 
[T]he real and/or personal property which is the subject 
matter of three civil actions pending in the District Courts of 
the Second Judicial District, for Weber, Davis and Morgan 
Counties, state of Utah, which actions are affecting his rights 
Moreover, these exhibits are new "evidence" submitted by Jenkins. They are not 
part of the record in the trial court. 
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(real and/or personal), claims (real and/or personal) and/or 
other interests (real and/or personal) in such property located 
in Weber County, Utah . . . . 
Further, the property as placed in trust by Lynn A. Jenkins L, 
the successor and President of Residential Mortgage, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, with Trustee Joseph M. Chambers Esq., 
was for subdivision development with DeLoy E. Wolfley and 
Maria Wolfley, and relates to the subject matter of two civil 
actions pending in the District Court of Lemhi County, state 
of Idaho, which actions relate to Residential Mortgage's Trust 
on or about July 20, 1990, by "Special Warranty Deed given 
to Joseph M. Chambers, as Trustee, in trust for DeLoy S. 
Wolfley and Maria Wolfley . . . 
The [Idaho] actions arise from the failure of the Barton 
Family Trust to perform as agreed by Walter E. Barton and 
his wife, Mary S. Barton of the sale and/or transfer of the real 
and/or personal property, and by this failure of the Barton 
Family Trust to complete the transfers and/or exchanges as 
agreed, affecting the Salmon Idaho property. 
(Jenkins Brief, Attachment G). 
On its face, the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien under the Utah Wrongful 
Lien Act because it was not "signed or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the 
owner of the property." The Notice of Interest is not signed by Smedley, Countrybrook, 
Country West or the City of Roy. It is signed by Jenkins only. Moreover, none of the 
claimed bases for the Notice of Interest included a document signed by Smedley, 
Countrybrook, Country West or the City of Roy. (R. at 294-99; Jenkins Brief, 
Attachment G). 
Further, the Notice of Interest was not a lien authorized by state or federal statute 
or authorized by a court order or judgment. (R. at 294-99). Statutory liens include liens 
for mechanics, hotels, hospitals, storage facilities, landlords, dry cleaners, judgment 
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creditors, taxing authorities. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 through 38-8-5 (2002). The 
Notice of Interest was not authorized by any of these statutes. The Notice of Interest was 
also not a security interest under the UCC because it did not involve goods, personal 
property or fixtures. (Jenkins Brief, Attachment G). 
Finally, the Notice of Interest was not authorized by a court order or judgment. 
(R. at 294-99). Although the Notice of Interest refers to lawsuits filed in Utah and Idaho, 
Smedley, Countrybrook, Country West and/or the City of Roy were not parties to those 
lawsuits. Nor was the Property the subject of those pending actions. Moreover, Jenkins 
has never obtained a judgment against Smedley, Countrybrook, Country West or the City 
of Roy. Indeed, the lawsuits referenced in the Notice of Interest were still pending and 
thus there had been no final judgment, much less a final judgment from a Utah court 
authorizing the Notice of Interest on the Property. Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
determined that the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien as defined by the Utah 
Wrongful Lien Act. (R. at 294-99). 
In his opening brief, however, Jenkins argues that a Special Warranty Deed, which 
he purported to have signed "as an accommodation," provided him with an interest in the 
Property pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-9-4. (Jenkins Brief at 8-10). In order to 
understand the speciousness of this claimed interest, it is first necessary to provide a brief 
history of the ownership of the Property. On April 13, 1990, counsel for the parties in 
litigation entitled Deloy Wolfley v. Edwin M. Higley, Case No. 46796, Second Judicial 
District Court for Davis County ("Wolfley-Higley Litigation") executed a Stipulation. 
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(R. at 54-60). The Stipulation, which was one of the Recorded Documents, provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
2. Defendant [Edwin M. Higley] agrees to transfer to 
Plaintiff, in full satisfaction of the Judgment (free and clear of 
all liens and encumbrances) the following property located in 
Davis County, State of Utah. Defendant agrees to transfer 
said property to Joseph M. Chambers, Attorney at Law, in 
Trust for Deloy and Maria Wolfley free and clear of all liens 
and encumbrances and to provide evidence of clear title all at 
his expense in the form of a title insurance policy in the 
amount of at least $25,000. [Legal description omitted]. 
3. The Plaintiff stipulates and agrees that any amounts 
received in the sale of the above described property (less 
costs and fees which may be required to be expended in 
developing or selling said property) over and above $12,000 
will be applied to the Judgment which they have received and 
obtained against Dale and Helen Smedley, Civil action No. 
2246 in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Morgan 
County, State of Utah, which Judgment has been docketed in 
Davis County, State of Utah. 
6. The Defendant shall immediately execute and deliver 
the Warranty Deed upon execution of this Stipulation and 
shall thereafter provide evidence of clear title by proper 
insurance by May 1, 1990. 
(Emphasis added.) Jenkins was neither a party to the Wolfley-Higley Litigation nor 
mentioned in the Stipulation. 
The real property described in the Stipulation is actually located in Weber County, 
not Davis County, and is referred to as the Chambers Property. At the time the parties 
executed the Stipulation, fee simple title to the Chambers Property was held by First 
American Equity Trust, a "dba" of Edwin M. Higley. In order to clear title to the 
Chambers Property, First American Equity Trust conveyed the Chambers Property to 
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Residential Mortgage Inc. pursuant to a Quit Claim Deed, which in turn conveyed the 
Chambers Property to Joseph M. Chambers, as Trustee, for the Wolfleys on July 20, 1990 
pursuant to a Special Warranty Deed. (See Attachment 1 of Plaintiffs' Addendum). The 
Special Warranty Deed, which was executed by Jenkins as President of Residential 
Mortgage, represents that "the officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed 
and the transfer represented thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted 
by the board of directors of the grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a 
quorum." (Jenkins Brief, Attachment A). 
There is nothing in the Stipulation or the Special Warranty Deed that suggests it 
was signed as an "accommodation" or that the Chambers Property was to be held as 
"security" for payment of the judgment or that Chambers was not authorized to sell the 
Chambers Property. Rather, the Stipulation clearly contemplated that the Chambers 
Property would be sold and the proceeds applied to other judgments obtained by the 
Wolfeys. Indeed, Jenkins' claim that the Chambers Property was merely "security" 
rather than a conveyance of fee title is belied by an affidavit he signed in connection with 
litigation entitled Deloy E. & Maria Wolfley v. Smedley Family Investment Co., Dale T. 
Smedley & Helen B. Smedley, and C. Demont Judd, Trustee of the Triple S. Trust, Case 
No. 950000011, Second Judicial District Court for Morgan County ("Wolfley-Smedley 
Litigation"). (Attachment 1 of Plaintiffs' Addendum). This affidavit is one of the 
Recorded Documents. In his affidavit, Jenkins testified under oath as follows: 
3. In February of 1990,1 attended a meeting in the First 
Security Bank Building, in Ogden, Utah at which Higley, 
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Harold R. Stephens (Higley's attorney), Wolfley and Joseph 
Chambers (Wolfley's attorney) were also present. 
4. One of the purposes of that meeting was to attempt to 
reach a negotiated settlement to discharge and satisfy all of 
the claims that Wolfley had against Higley and Smedley, 
individually and jointly. 
5. During the meeting Wolfley expressly agreed to accept 
a conveyance of clear fee title a certain parcel of 
approximately seven (7) acres of real property located in Roy 
City, Weber County, sometimes known as Countrybrook 
Subdivision No. 2 [the Chambers Property], as full and 
complete satisfaction of all claims Wolfley had against Higley 
and Smedley, including those claims theretofore reduced to 
judgement [sic] and those not yet so adjudicated. 
6. The [Chambers] Property was then being held by in 
the name of First America Equity Trust, a fictitious name 
used by Higley. 
* * * 
8. On or about May 2, 1990, Higley, through his dba 
"First American Equity Trust," conveyed by Quit Claim Deed 
fee title to the [Chambers] Property to Residential Mortgage 
Inc., a Utah corporation then owned and managed by me . . . 
9. On or about July 20, 1990, in my capacity as president 
of Residential Mortgage, Inc., and upon instructions by 
Higley and Smedley, / executed a Special Warranty Deed as 
requested by Wolfley, conveying fee title to the [Chambers] 
Property to "Joseph M. Chambers, as Trustee, in Trust for 
Deloy Wolfley and Maria Wolfley. 
Thus, fee simple of the Chambers Property was conveyed to Chambers, who in turn 
conveyed a portion of it to Plaintiffs/ The Notice of Interest, however, is not even 
5
 As the trial court properly noted, even if Jenkins' allegations are true, this only 
means that Edwin E. Higley may have a claim against Chambers or the Wolfeys for 
breach of the Stipulation. It does not mean that Jenkins may lien the Property or assert 
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signed by or authorized by a document signed by Chambers, who owned the Property 
from 1990 to 1997. Under these circumstances, the trial court correctly determined that 
the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act. As this 
Court has explained, "to file a Notice of Interest under § 57-9-4, the person must 
minimally cclaim[] to have an interest in the land." Russell 999 P.2d at 1248 f 13. If the 
person does not have an actual interest in the land, the Notice of Interest "could not be 
authorized by § 57-9-4 and is therefore not exempted from [the Utah Wrongful Lien 
Act]." Id. l^ 14. This Court should affirm the trial court's determination. 
D. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Recorded Documents 
Were Wrongful Liens Under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act 
The trial court also correctly determined that the Recorded Documents were 
wrongful liens under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act. 
It was difficult to determine the exact purpose of the Recorded Documents. They 
did not support Jenkins' contention that he had an interest in the Property. (R. at 237-
44). Indeed, nowhere in the Recorded Documents was Jenkins' purported interest 
mentioned. In his own affidavit, Jenkins did not claim an interest in the Property nor did 
he testify that the Property was being held for his benefit by Chambers. (Attachment 1 of 
Plaintiffs' Addendum). Nor did the Recorded Documents support Jenkins' contention 
that Dale T. Smedley owed Jenkins money. Jenkins was not even a party to any of the 
lawsuits referred to in the Recorded Documents. (R. at 237-44). Finally, the Recorded 
claims against Plaintiffs, who were bona fide purchasers for value and who were not 
parties to the Stipulation. 
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Documents did not support Jenkins' contention that Dale T. Smedley is the "real" owner 
of the Property.6 Instead, the Recorded Documents did nothing more than create 
additional clouds on Plaintiffs' title to the Property and show Jenkins' willingness to 
ignore Utah law and Plaintiffs' rights in his efforts to exact money from Plaintiffs. (R. at 
237-44). 
Thus, the Recorded Documents were clearly wrongful liens under the Utah 
Wrongful Lien Act. The Recorded Documents were not liens or encumbrances 
authorized by a state or federal statute. They were not liens or encumbrances authorized 
by a court order or judgment either. Although some of the Recorded Documents were 
judgments or referred to judgments, the Recorded Documents did not authorize the 
recording of any lien or encumbrance on the Property, much less a lien or encumbrance 
for the benefit of Jenkins. Finally, the Recorded Documents were not liens or 
encumbrances signed by the owner of the Property. Again, some of the Recorded 
Documents were signed by the then-owner of the Property. For example, the Stipulation 
referred to above was signed by Edwin E. Higley at the time he owned the Property. (R. 
at 54-60). As stated above, the Stipulation did not authorize Jenkins to file a lien or 
6
 In his opening brief, Jenkins asserts that Plaintiffs are really the alter egos of Dale 
T. Smedley. Dale T. Smedley, who is Smedley's father, was not the owner or the 
developer of the Property. Dale T. Smedley was not a member of Countrybrook or an 
officer or director of Country West. Even if Jenkins' allegations were true, however, the 
Notice of Interest was still a wrongful lien because the Notice of Interest was not signed 
by Dale T. Smedley or authorized by document signed by Dale T. Smedley. Moreover, 
Jenkins has failed to provide any evidence that he was authorized by a court order or 
judgment or state or federal statute to file the Notice of Interest against real property 
owned by Dale T. Smedley, much less real property owned by his son. 
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encumbrance on the Property. Nor did the Stipulation or other Recorded Documents 
convey an interest in the Property to Jenkins. Consequently, the trial court correctly 
determined that each of the Recorded Documents was a wrongful lien under the Utah 
Wrongful Lien Act. This Court should affirm the trial court's determination. 
E. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that Plaintiffs Are Entitled to the 
$30,000 in Escrow. 
The trial court also correctly determined that Plaintiffs were entitled to the 
$30,000 in escrow because it was placed in escrow as "substitute" property for the 
Country West Parcel. (R. at 294-99). During the proceedings below, Jenkins argued that 
the $30,000 placed in escrow as "compensation to Jenkins as a partial consideration for 
his Partial Release of his Notice of Interest." (R. at 246-77). On appeal, Jenkins asserts 
that he "settled" with the "owner" of the Property and therefore the trial court erred by 
"releasing Country West's $30,000 held in trust without naming Country West as a 
party."7 (Jenkins Brief at 13-14). Jenkins continues to misrepresent the agreement 
between the parties regarding the $30,000 in escrow. At the time Jenkins recorded the 
Notice of Interest, Country West still owed Plaintiffs $30,000 on the sale of the Country 
West Parcel from Plaintiffs to Country West. (R. at 168). Plaintiffs, Country West and 
Jenkins agreed that this $30,000 would be placed in escrow to serve as substitute property 
for the Country West Parcel and that Jenkins would release the Notice of Interest from 
the Country West Parcel. (R. at 168). In other words, Jenkins agreed to transfer his 
n 
In his opening brief, Jenkins continues to argue that Country West should have 
been named as a party. At no time, however, has Country West attempted to intervene or 
assert that the trial court improperly released the $30,000 to Plaintiffs. 
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claim from the Country West Parcel to the $30,000 in escrow "pending a resolution of the 
claims and rights of [Jenkins] in the real property of the said Notice of Interest." If the 
$30,000 was intended to be compensation for the Partial Release, Plaintiffs would have 
simply paid the $30,000 directly to Jenkins rather than place it in escrow. Because the 
trial court correctly determined that Jenkins did not have an interest in any of the 
Property described in the Notice of Interest, the trial court properly awarded the $30,000 
to Plaintiffs. (R. at 294-99). 
F. The Trial Court's Decision Did Not Deprive Jenkins of Due Process or 
His Right to a Jury Trial. 
With no legal citation or factual support, Jenkins argues in his opening brief that 
the Utah Wrongful Lien Act and the trial court's disposition of this case is in "direct 
conflict with" and "fails to recognize a person's right to due process, equal protection 
[and] right for a jury trial." (Jenkins Brief at 7). These arguments are being raised for the 
first time on appeal and should not be considered by this Court. As this Court has 
explained, "[a]s a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a 
constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court 
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances." Groberg v. 
Housing Opportunities, Inc., 468 Utah Adv. Rep. 7111 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
In any event, these arguments are without merit. The trial court did not violate the 
Utah Constitution by complying with the Utah Wrongful Lien Act. As the Utah Supreme 
Court has explained, in our judicial system all parties are "entitled to notice that a 
particular issue is being considered by a court and to an opportunity to present evidence 
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and argument on that issue before decision." A "failure to give adequate notice and 
opportunity to participate can constitute a denial of due process under article I, section 7 
of the Utah Constitution." Plumb v. Utah, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990). In other 
words, a hearing that is "prefaced by timely notice which adequately informs the parties 
of the specific issues they must be prepared to meet" satisfies due process. Davies v. 
Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
These standards were clearly met in this case. Jenkins was notified of all four 
hearings, including the issues that were to be considered by the court at each hearing. 
Jenkins was given the opportunity to meaningfully participate in each hearing. The fact 
that Jenkins did not have sufficient evidence to establish a legal basis for recording the 
Notice of Interest and Recorded Documents does not mean that he was prevented from 
presenting what sparse "evidence" he did have. 
Finally, Jenkins' argument that the trial court's disposition of this matter violated 
his "right" to a jury trial is also without merit. (Jenkins Brief at 13). The Utah Supreme 
Court rejected such an argument over fifty years ago in Raymond v. Union Pac. R. Co.: 
It has been strenuously argued by plaintiff that this decision 
[dismissing his complaint] has deprived him of his 
constitutional right to a jury trial. That contention has been 
urged upon this court in almost every case of nonsuit and 
directed verdict brought before us. This court is charged with 
the duty of protecting all of the rights of all litigants. This is 
especially true of those fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
State and Federal Constitutions. But the right to have a jury 
pass upon issues of fact does not include the right to have a 
cause submitted to the jury in the hope of a verdict where the 
facts undisputably show that the plaintiff is not entitled to 
relief. 
516298.4 29 
191 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah 1948). Thus, the trial court's Judgment did not deprive Jenkins 
of his constitutional rights. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT JENKINS 
WAS LIABLE TO PLAINTIFFS FOR DAMAGES AND REASONABLE 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS UNDER THE UTAH WRONGFUL 
LIEN ACT. 
The trial court correctly determined that Jenkins, by recording the Notice of 
Interest and Recorded Documents on the Property and refusing to release them within 
twenty days from the date of Plaintiffs5 written request, was liable to Plaintiffs for 
damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. (R. at 294-99). The Utah Wrongful 
Lien Act provides: 
A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien 
. . . to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder 
against real property is liable to the record interest holder for 
any actual damages proximately caused by the wrongful lien. 
If the person . . . refuses to release or correct the wrongful 
lien with 20 days from the date of written request from a 
record interest holder of the real property . . . the person is 
liable to that record interest holder for $1,000 or treble 
damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorneys' 
fees and costs. 
A person is liable to the record owner of real property for 
$3,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and 
for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who records or files or 
causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien . . . knowing or 
having reason to know that the document is (a) a wrongful 
lien; (b) is groundless; or (c) contains a material misstatement 
or false claim. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4 (1)(3) (2002). 
Under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act, the award of damages and attorneys' fees and 
costs is mandatory if the trial court finds that the lien or document is a wrongful lien: 
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Following a hearing on the matter, if the court determines that 
the document is a wrongful lien, the court shall issue an order 
declaring the wrongful lien void ab initio, releasing the 
property from the lien, and awarding costs and attorneys' 
fees to the petitioner. 
Id. § 38-9-7(5)(a) (emphasis added). As stated above, the trial court correctly found that 
Jenkins' Notice of Interest and the Recorded Documents were wrongful liens under the 
Utah Wrongful Lien Act. (R. at 294-99). The fact that Jenkins partially released the 
Notice of Interest on the Country West Parcel before the hearing does not relieve him of 
liability for the recording of the Notice of Interest or the Recorded Documents. As this 
Court has previously held: 
The [Utah Wrongful Lien Act's] plain language clearly 
allows one whose property has been wrongfully encumbered 
to recover if such encumbrance is not removed within twenty 
days from the day the owner requests its removal, [internal 
citations omitted] The statute makes no mention whatsoever 
that recovery is barred if the encumbrance has been removed, 
even if 'replaced' by a non-wrongful encumbrance . . . . 
Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (internal citation 
omitted). Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that Plaintiffs were entitled to 
damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 
A. The Trial Court's Determination that Plaintiffs Incurred $13,550 in 
Actual Damages as a Result of the Wrongful Liens Was Not Clearly 
Erroneous. 
The trial court found that Plaintiffs incurred actual damages in the amount of 
$13,550.00 as a result of the wrongful liens recorded by Jenkins. (R. at 675-84). 
Plaintiffs established, through affidavit testimony, that the costs of developing Phase 10 
of the Property increased by $13,550.00 as a result of the delay of over one year caused 
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by the wrongful liens. Plaintiffs also established that they did not receive any "benefit" 
from the delay because they were contractually obligated to sell the lots in Phase 10 for 
the price negotiated prior to the recording of the Notice of Interest and the Recorded 
Documents. (R. at 344-59). The trial court held a hearing on the issue of these damages 
and requested supplemental affidavits to address certain issues raised by Jenkins at the 
hearing. (R. at 602). Plaintiffs submitted a supplemental affidavit that addressed these 
issues. (R. at 603-40). Jenkins did not submit an affidavit or otherwise challenge 
supplemental affidavit of Smedley. After reviewing all of the evidence, the trial court 
found that Plaintiffs incurred actual damages in the amount of $13,550.00 as a result of 
the wrongful liens recorded by Jenkins. (R. at 675-84). 
In his opening brief, Jenkins does not submit any competent evidence to challenge 
this finding, much less fulfill his marshalling burden. Accordingly, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's finding that Plaintiffs' incurred actual damages of $13,550.00 as a 
result of the wrongful liens and that they were entitled to recover such damages from 
Jenkins under § 38-9-4 of the Utah Wrongful Lien Act. 
B. The Trial Court's Determination that the Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
Incurred by Plaintiffs Were Reasonable Was Not Clearly Erroneous. 
The trial court also properly found that the attorneys' fees and costs incurred by 
Plaintiffs were reasonable. In support of their request for attorneys' fees and costs, 
Plaintiff submitted the Affidavits of Laura S. Scott and T. Richard Davis, which complied 
in all respects with Rule 4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The 
Affidavits state the specific "legal basis of the award, the nature of the work performed 
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by the attorneys, [and] the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim." R.T. Nielsen 
Co. v. Cook, 40 P.3d 1119, 1126 f 21 (Utah 2002) (quoting Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-
505(1)). They also affirmatively state that the work performed was reasonably necessary 
to adequately prosecute the matter, that the billing rates were consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in Weber County, Utah for similar services, and that numerous 
meritless pleadings filed by Jenkins increased the amount of attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred. See James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 669 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (listing factors to be used by trial court in determining reasonable 
attorneys' fees). Because the calculation of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs is in the 
sound discretion of the trial court, this Court should defer to the trial judge who actually 
presided over the proceeding and had first-hand familiarity with all of the hearings and 
meritless pleadings filed by Jenkins. This Court should affirm the trial court's finding 
that Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs were reasonable. See Cafferty, 46 P.3d at 238 
126. 
IIL THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO TREBLE PLAINTIFFS' ACTUAL 
DAMAGES UNDER THE UTAH WRONGFUL LIEN ACT WAS 
INCORRECT. 
In the proceedings below, the trial court awarded Plaintiffs actual damages in the 
amount of $13,550.00. The trial court, however, refused to treble these damages as 
required by the Utah Wrongful Lien Act because it believed that to do so would be an 
"unlawful penalty." (R. at 675-84). The trial court's refusal to treble Plaintiffs' actual 
damages was incorrect as a matter of law because the trebling of damages is mandatory 
under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act. 
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As set forth above, the Utah Wrongful Lien Act provides: 
A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien 
. . . to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder 
against real property is liable to the record interest holder for 
any actual damages proximately caused by the wrongful lien. 
If the person . . . refuses to release or correct the wrongful 
lien with 20 days from the date of written request from a 
record interest holder of the real property . . . the person is 
liable to that record interest holder for $1,000 or treble 
damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorneys' 
fees and costs. 
A person is liable to the record owner of real property for 
$3,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and 
for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who records or files or 
causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien . . . knowing or 
having reason to know that the document is (a) a wrongful 
lien; (b) is groundless; or (c) contains a material misstatement 
or false claim. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4(l)(3) (2002). 
In construing the Utah Wrongful Lien Act, this Court determines its meaning by 
first looking to the statute's plain language, and giving effect to the plain language unless 
the language is ambiguous. Lovendahl v. Jordan School District, 2002 UT 130 f 20. 
This Court must read '"the words of a statute literally . . . and give the words their usual 
and accepted meaning.'" Anglin v. Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc., 37 P.3d 
267, 269 f 9 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (citing Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,. 21 
P.3d 231, 232 19 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000)). In doing so, this Court must "assume that each 
term was used advisedly by the legislature." Id. (citing Biddle v. Washington Terrace 
City, 993 P.2d 875, 879 f 14 (Utah 1999)). 
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The Utah Wrongful Lien Act is exceedingly plain on its face. By using the phase 
"is liable" rather than "may be liable" the Utah Legislature evinced its intent that the 
award of treble damages is mandatory, not discretionary. Accordingly, the trial court's 
refusal to the treble Plaintiffs' actual damages was incorrect and this Court should reverse 
the Judgment with respect to the trebling of damages. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the Judgment except as it 
relates to the trial court's refusal to treble Plaintiffs' actual damages. On that issue, this 
Court should reverse the Judgment and remand to the trial court with instructions to 
amend the Judgment to treble the actual damages incurred by Plaintiffs. Finally, 
Plaintiffs request that the Judgment be augmented to award them their attorneys' fees and 
costs incurred on this appeal. See Russell, 999 P.2d at 1248 ^ [16 (concluding that when a 
party who received attorneys' fees below prevails on appeal, "the party is also entitled to 
fees reasonably incurred on appeal") (citing Valcarce, supra, 961 P.2d at 319). 
DATED this Z ^ d a y of March, 2003. 
JOHN B. WILSON 
LAURA S. SCOTT 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Appellees and Cross-
Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of March, 2003, I caused to be served, via 
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
PLAINTIFFS, APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS to: 
Lynn A. Jenkins I. 
3 East 2750 South 
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T. Richard Davis(083 6) 
Gateway Tower Eas£~7^ Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utati~>*133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for Defendants Smedley 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MORGAN COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DELOY E. & MARIA WOLFLEY, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SMEDLEY FAMILY INVESTMENT CO. , 
a Utah Corporation, DALE T. 
SMEDLEY) ' & HELENJ. ^ SMEDL^Y, 
husband an'd^/lfe^X^C. DEMONT 
JUDD, Trustees of the Triple 
S. Trust, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN ALLAN 
JENKINS IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 950000011 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
ss 
) 
COMES NOW, LYNN ALLAN JENKINS, having first been duly sworn 
on oath, and states the following: 
1. I am not a party in the above-entitled action, but have 
been, during all times relevant hereto, a business associate of 
Edwin Higley ("Higley"), and'I have personal knowledge of all 
facts set forth herein. 
2. Prior to February 1990, I was aware that Deloy Wolfley 
("Wolfley") had various claims against Dale T. Smedley 
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("Smedley") and Higley, some of which had been reduced to 
judgments and were at that time the subject of attempted 
execution by Wolfley. 
3. In February of 1990, I attended a meeting in the First 
Security Bank Building, in Ogden, Utah at which Higley, Harold R. 
Stephens (Higley's attorney), Wolfley and Joseph Chambers 
(Wolfley's attorney) were also in attendance. 
4. One of the purposes of that meeting was to attempt to 
reach a negotiated settlement to discharge and satisfy all of the 
claims that Wolfley had against Higley and Smedley, individually 
and jointly. 
5. During the meeting Wolfley expressly agreed to accept a 
conveyance of clear fee title a certain parcel of approximately 
seven (7) acres of real property located in Roy City, Weber 
County, sometimes known as Countrybrook Subdivision No.2 (the 
"Property"), as full and complete satisfaction of all claims 
Wolfley had against Higley and Smedley, including those claims 
theretofore reduced to judgement and those not yet so 
adjudicated. 
o. The Property was then being held by in the name of 
First America Equity Trust, a fictitious name used by Higley. 
7. Pursuant to the agreement reached that day, for the 
next several months I assisted Higley and Smedley in clearing 
title to the Property. 
8. On or about May 2, 199C, Higley, through his dba "First 
2 
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American Equity Trust, ff conveyed by Quit Claim Deed fee title to 
the Property to Residential Mortgage Inc., a Utah corporation 
then owned and managed by me. Said Quit Claim Deed was recorded 
in the office of the Weber County Recorder on May 2, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A. n 
9. On or about July 20, 1990, in my capacity as president 
of Residential Mortgage, Inc., and upon instructions by Higley 
and Smedley, I executed a Special Warranty Deed as requested by 
Wolfley, conveying fee title to the Property to "Joseph M. 
Chambers, as Trustee, in Trust for Deloy wolfley and Maria 
Wolfley." Said Special Warranty Deed was originally recorded in 
the office of the Weber County Recorder on July 26, 1990 and 
rerecorded on September 13, 1990, a true and correct copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
10. The conveyance described in paragraph 9 above was made 
conditional upon and for full satisfaction and release of all 
claims Wolfley held against both Smedley and Higley, and their 
respective business entities. 
11. Since the time of the conveyance, I have believed that 
all of Wolfley7s claims against Higley and Smedley, including 
Smedley's obligations to Wolfley under the Agreement which is the 
subject to this lawsuit, have been paid in full and satisfied. 
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DATED this 3-\ —day of October, 1998. 
ALLAN" JENKINS 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this S-i"' 
day of October, 1998, by LYNN-ALLAN ^JENKINS. 
Hvxn io axvxs 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN ALLAN JENKINS IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage 
prepaid, and faxing a copy to (435) 753-2091 on this ^' day of 
October, 1998 to the following: 
Stephen W. Jewell 
15 South Main, Third Floor 
Logan, UT 84321 
'jjJsl ClAjaju^— 
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